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I.
INTRODUCTION
"The King can do no wrong, while an individual may."' That
proposition has long embodied the United States government's 2 seemingly
hypocritical policies regarding how it compensates victims of its tortious
acts and eminent domain power, as it operates with carte blanches vis-a-vis
its sovereign immunity. 3 Although immunizing the Government from
liability is a necessary evil in order for it to efficiently and effectively
operate, the Government has recently traveled beyond the bounds of this
rationale and received cooperation from the Federal Circuit to do such.4
That is, the Government and its subcontractors are immune from liability
when they practice a United States patented process if they do not practice
I Schillinger v. United States, 24 Ct. CI. 278, 294 (1889).
2 The Federal Government of the United States of America [hereinafter Government].
3 See, e.g., Schillinger, 24 Ct. Cl. 278.
4 See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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all the steps of the process "within the United States." 5 Furthermore, they
are immune from liability if they import into the United States patented
products made from the aforementioned practiced method patent.
6
Judge Plager articulated why the Federal Circuit came to such a
conclusion, for "there [was] no guidance in the [relevant] statute, in the
legislative history, or in the prior cases as to what to make of th[e relevant]
provision when the steps of a method patent have been performed [by the
Government or its subcontractors] both in and out of the country."
7
However, as the learned judge so wisely opined, "that [was] no reason to
abandon logical analysis in preference for a policy-rooted and result-driven
conclusion."
8
In addition, it is possible that the Federal Circuit's interpretation of
section 1498 is in violation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights. 9 Accordingly, Congress must step in and
combat this injustice and potential liability by updating section 1498 of
Title 28 of the United States Code to provide patentees' ° a remedy for the
Government's, or its subcontractors', nefarious behavior.
11
This paper discusses the history and common law development of the
United States law regarding government use of individuals' patents and
section 1498; analyzes section 1498's compliance with the TRIPS
agreement; compares such law to various other countries' legislative
schemes in order to find brilliance which this Author may use for his own
legislative proposal; and justifies why such a proposal fills the current
legislative gaps while maintaining the relevant policies.
II.
AMERICAN LAW
A. A Concise History
1. The Pavement Case
On July 19, 1870, John Schillinger's patent for "an improvement in
5 Id. at 1354 (Garjarsa, J., concurring).
6 See id. at 1352-53 (majority opinion).
7 Id. at 1382 (Plager, J., dissenting).
8 Id. (Plager, J., dissenting).
9 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS].
10 The terms "patentee," "patent holder," and "patent owner" are used interchangeably in
this paper to refer to the patent's assignee.
11 See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000).
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laying concrete" issued and reissued on May 2, 1871 as RE4364.12 On July
3, 1871, Schillinger contracted to various individuals, including Charles
Creecy, the "exclusive right or license to construct and lay [Schillinger's]
patented pavement. . . within the ... District of Columbia" in exchange for
a set royalty based on square footage. 13 Four months later, Schillinger and
the various individuals (the "Pavement Plaintiffs") entered into a license
agreement with the Artificial Stone Company which granted the company
the rights to practice the Schillinger patent in the District of Columbia for
ten years in exchange for a royalty rate paid to Schillinger.
14
Approximately two years later, the Artificial Stone Company assigned its
rights under the aforementioned agreement to Charles Roberts.
15
About nineteen months later, Edward Clark, the Capitol's Architect
requested bids for "laying concrete pavement required for the improvement
of the Capitol Grounds." 16  Although Creecy and Roberts bid on the
improvement, G. W. Cook underbid them and won the contract.
17
Schillinger put Clark on notice that Cook would be infringing the
Schillinger patent; however, Clark and his staff could not determine
whether the Schillinger patent was valid and furthermore believed that "the
interest of the Government. .. would best be []served by giving the
contract to the lowest bidder." 18 Accordingly, between 1875 and 1881,
Cook laid 236,571 square feet of pavement and the Government paid him
$67,432.93.19 From 1882 until 1885, a series of assignments resulted in the
patent rights 20 vesting with Creecy.
21
a. Court of Claims' Decision
The Pavement Plaintiffs brought an action in the United States Court
of Claims against the United States based on a theory of breach of "implied
contract for the use, upon the Capitol Grounds, of a patent for improvement
in pavements." 22 Assuming the Schillinger patent was valid and Cook's
cement pavement infringed said patent, the court addressed the sole issue as
to whether a contract existed between the Pavement Plaintiffs and the
12 Schillinger v. United States, 24 Ct. CI. 278, 279 (1889).
13 Id. at 279-80.
14 See id. at 281-82.
15 See id.
16 Id. at 283.
17 See id.
18 Id. at 287.
19 See id. at 285.
20 Those patent rights which were subject to the suit below.
21 Schillinger, 24 Ct. CI. at 285-92.
22 Id. at 291-92.
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United States Government. 23 The court held that no contract could be
implied between the Pavement Plaintiffs and the Government and,
accordingly, the Pavement Plaintiffs were seeking compensation for a
"denial of private right in an alleged patent" that the Government happened
to use, whereby said "use [was] in the nature of a tort" and such a tort
action against the Government was not within the court's jurisdiction. 24 In
fact, the only recourse was for Congress to compensate the Pavement
Plaintiffs and Congress denied their appeal.25 The court reasoned that the
Government never acknowledged the Pavement Plaintiffs' rights in the
Schillinger patent - as Clark and his staff could not conclude whether the
Schillinger patent was valid - nor that Cook's cement pavement infringed
the Schillinger patent and, therefore, no compensation was justified because
the Government did not act through its "competent agent" to take or use
private property while "acknowledging explicitly or tacitly that the property
[was] individual property." 26  The court believed that "the taking of
intangible property" differed form "the taking of tangible party" because a
"the Government's use of a patent right" does not "per se" cause the
patentee loss; "whereas if a tangible article be appropriated the owner
instantly becomes so much the poorer. "27 The court summarized its legal
findings by stating that:
[I]f the Government actually acquire[d] the property, even though the
act of an agent not competent, a contract to pay for it is implied; while
the use of a patented process or article may directly deprive the owner
of nothing of intrinsic value, but be simply an invasion of a right, an act
which, to bind the Government, must be performed by a competent
agent.2
8
b. Sumpreme Court's Decision
In 1894, the Supreme Court heard the appeal and affirmed the lower
court's decision that the Pavement Plaintiffs lacked a cause of action
against the Government.
29
i. Justice Brewer's Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice Brewer stated the principle that the
Government "cannot be sued in their courts without" Congress' consent and
23 See id. at 293.
24 Id. at 298.
25 Id. at 292.
26 Id. at 292, 298.
27 Id. at 298-99.
28 Id. at 299.
29 See Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894).
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"the court may not go, no matter how beneficial they may deem or in fact
might be their possession of a larger jurisdiction over the liabilities of the
Government." 30 The majority interpreted Congress' authorization for the
Court of Claims to hear, inter alia, "claims founded upon the
Constitution... or any contract, expressed or implied, with the
Government... in cases not sounding in tort" to exclude claims of patent
infringement. 31  First, the Supreme Court noted that the Pavement
Plaintiffs' claim of patent infringement was "sounding in tort" because:
Here the claimants never authorized the use of the patent right by the
[G]overnment; never consented to, but always protested against it;
threatening to interfere by injunction or other proceedings to restrain
such use. There was no act of congress in terms directing or even by
implication suggesting, the use of the patent. No officer of the
[G]overnment directed its use, and the contract which was executed by
Cook did not name or describe it. There was no recognition by the
[G]overnment or any of its officers of the fact that in the construction
of the pavement there was any use of the patent, or that any
appropriation was being made of claimants' property. The
[G]overnment proceeded as though it were acting only in the
management of its own property and the exercise of its own rights, and
without any trespass upon the rights of the claimants. There was no
point in the whole transaction from its commencement to its close
where the minds of the parties met, or where there was anything in the
semblance of an agreement. So, not only does the petition count upon a
tort, but also the findings show a tort.
3 2
Finally, the Supreme Court noted that Cook may have used the
process embodied within the Schillinger patent to construct the pavement
and by the Government consenting to Cook's use it was "also liable as a
joint tort feasor." 33 Nonetheless, the majority found that such an action
would also be "sounding in tort" and thus the Government was immune
from suit arising out of that action as well.
34
ii. Justice Harlan's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Shiras, wrote the dissenting opinion
in which he cited the principle that the Government grants patentees an
exclusive right and thus may not "appropriate[] or use[]" a patented
30 Id. at 166.
31 Id. at 167, 170 (citing Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (providing for the
bringing of suits against the Government of the United States)) (emphasis added).
32 Id. at 170.
33 Id. at 171-72.
34 Id. at 172.
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invention without compensating the patent holder. 35 In short, the dissent
determined that:
[W]hen the government, by its agent, knowingly uses or permits to be
used for its benefit a valid patented invention, it is liable to suit in the
Court of Claims for the value of such use, and that its liability arises
out of contract based upon the constitutional requirement that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. 36
In the case at hand, the Government granted Clark broad authority to spend
public funds "according to specified plans," Clark intentionally allowed the
use of the Schillinger patent, "not disputing the rights of the patentee, but
leaving the question of validity. .. to judicial determination.
'" 37
In addition, the dissent believed that exclusive of finding a contract,
"the claim to have just compensation for... an appropriation of private
property to the public use [was] founded upon the Constitution" and thus
within Congress' jurisdictional grant to the Court of Claims.
38
2. The Gun Carriage Case
Fried. Krupp Aktiengesell-schaft (Fried), a German company, held
United States Patent Nos. 772,724, 772,725 and 791,347 which issued in
1903, 1903 and 1905, respectively, regarding "improvements in guns and
gun carriages." 39  Fried claimed that William Crozier used and
manufactured various products which infringed the aforementioned
patents. 40  Crozier, a United States Army officer, stipulated that the
Government manufactured and used "field guns and carriages" which Fried
alleged infringed its patents.41  Accordingly, Fried brought suit in the
District of Columbia. 42 In short, the trial court dismissed the case because
it lacked jurisdiction, as "the suit was really against the United States";
however, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision because it
contended that the suit was against a United States officer to keep him from
infringing the patentee's rights, not against the Government for property in
which it was already using and possessing.43 The Supreme Court granted
writ.
44
35 Id. at 173 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357
(1881)).
36 Id. at 178-79 (emphasis added).
37 Id. at 178.
38 Id. at 179 (internal quotations omitted).
39 Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesell-schaft, 224 U.S. 290, 297 (1912).
40 Id. at 298.
41 Id. at 299.
42 See id.
43 Id. at 300-01.
44 Id. at 301.
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a. Sumpreme Court's Decision
By the time the Supreme Court heard the case, Congress passed
section 1498's predecessor (the "1910 Act") which read as follows:
An Act to Provide Additional Protection for Owners of Patents of the
United States, and for Other Purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That whenever an invention
described in and covered by a patent of the United States shall hereafter
be used by the United States without license of the owner thereof or
lawful right to use the same, such owner may recover reasonable
compensation for such use by suit in the court of claims: Provided,
however, That said court of claims shall not entertain a suit or reward
compensation under the provisions of this act where the claim for
compensation is based on the use by the United States of any article
heretofore owned, leased, used by, or in the possession of, the United
States: Provided further, That in any such suit the United States may
avail itself of any and all defenses, general or special, which might be
pleaded by a defendant in an action for infringement, as set forth in title
sixty of the Revised Statutes or otherwise: And provided further, That
the benefits of this act, shall not inure to any patentee who, when he
makes such claim, is in the employment or service of the government
of the United States; or the assignee of any such patentee; nor shall this
act apply to any device discovered or invented by such employee
during the time of his employment or service.
4 5
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the law before the passage of
the 1910 Act was that as described in Schillinger and that Congress passed
the 1910 Act because it was "inspired by the injustice of [the Schillinger]
rule."
46
The Supreme Court referred to "the intangible nature-patent rights-
of the property taken" and expressed that "there [was] no room for doubt
that the statute makes full and adequate provision for the exercise of the
power of eminent domain for which, considered in its final analysis, it was
the purpose of the statute to provide." 4 7 The Supreme Court concluded that
because the Government exercised its "right of eminent domain" to acquire
"a license to use the patented inventions in question," Fried had no right to
injunctive relief against Crozier and thus the trial court should rehear the
case under the 1910 Act.
4 8
45 Id. at 302-03 (quoting Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851 (providing
additional protection for owners of patents of the United States)) (emphasis added).
46 See id. at 303-304 (citing Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894)); see also
supra Part I.A. .b.i (discussing Schillinger, 155 U.S. 163).
47 Crozier, 224 U.S. at 306-07.
48 Id. at 308-09.
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3. The Dam Case
E. P. Jacobs owned farms along a creek in Alabama. 49 In 1925, the
Government constructed a dam on the Tennessee River which "caused an
increase in the occasional overflows of [Jacobs'] lands." 50  After
negotiations with the Government proved to be "inadequate," Jacobs
brought suit against the Government under the Tucker Act for taking his
property without providing him with "just compensation." 5 1 The trial court
found in favor of Jacobs; however, the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial
court's decision.5 2 The Supreme Court granted writ and entered its decision
in 1933. 53
a. The Sumpreme Court's Decision
Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, disagreed with the Fifth Circuit
by finding that Jacob's suit was:
[B]ased on the right to recover just compensation for property taken by
the United States for public use in the exercise of its power of eminent
domain. That right was guaranteed by the Constitution. The fact that
condemnation proceedings were not instituted and that the right was
asserted in suits by the owners did not change the essential nature of the
claim. The form of the remedy did not qualify the right. It rested upon
the Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition was not necessary. A
promise to pay was not necessary. Such a promise was implied
because of the duty to pay imposed by the amendment. The suits were
thus founded upon the Constitution of the United States.
54
Accordingly, the Supreme Court ordered the Government to pay
Jacobs "just compensation. "
5 5
B. Pertinent Statutory Test
Before February 24, 1855, a patentee's only recourse against the
Government for infringement was vis-a-vis an appeal to Congress.
56
Thereafter, an act of Congress authorized the Court of Claims to hear, inter
alia, "claims founded upon the Constitution... or any contract, expressed
49 Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 15 (1933) (reference to Jacobs includes E. P.
Jacobs and the executor of his estate, Augustus Gunter).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See id. at 15-16.
53 See id.
54 Id. at 16 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
55 Id. at 17-18.
56 Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 166 (1894).
[Vol 4:2
Spring 2007]
or implied, with the Government... in cases not sounding in tort." 57 In
1910, Congress consented to private suits against the Government to
provide a remedy against it using patentees' inventions.58 In 1918,
Congress afforded government contractors and employees the immunity
from patent liability arising out of their government-authorized work "to
encourage these contractors to undertake work that would aid the war
effort."59 In 1942, Congress further supplemented the statute with language
"to clarify that actions against the United States employees or contractors
were barred and replaced by an action against the United States." 60  In
1960, Congress added subsection (c), which addresses infringing behavior
in foreign countries.
6 1
The modern embodiment of section 1498 states:
(a) Whenever an invention described in and covered by a
patent of the United States is used or manufactured by or for
the United States without license of the owner thereof or
lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner's
remedy shall be by action against the United States in the
United States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his
reasonable and entire compensation for such use and
manufacture.
For the purposes of this section, the use or manufacture of an
invention described in and covered by a patent of the United
States by a contractor, a subcontractor, or any person, firm, or
corporation for the Government and with the authorization or
consent of the Government, shall be construed as use or
manufacture for the United States.
(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any claim arising in
a foreign country.
6 2
57 Id. (citing Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (providing for the bringing of
suits against the Government of the United States)) (emphasis added).
58 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 51 Fed. C1. 829, 836 (2002) (citing Act of June 25,
1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851 (providing additional protection for owners of patents of the
United States)).
59 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 688, 691 n.5 (2003) (internal citations
omitted).
60 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1369 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Dyk, J.,
concurring) (citing Pub. L. No. 77-768, § 6, 56 Stat. 1013, 1014 (1942); S. Rep. No. 77-
1640, at 5 (1942)).
61 Id. at 1381.
62 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000).
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C. Common Law Interpretation of Modern Statutory Law
1. The Zoltek Case
Zoltek Corporation holds United States Reissue Patent No. RE34,162
which embodies a method for manufacturing "silicon carbide fiber sheet
products used by the F-22 fighter program." 63  The Government
"contracted with Lockheed Martin Corporation to design and build the F-22
fighter"64 and Lockheed "subcontracted with other companies to provide
fiber sheet products for the F-22 fighter" 65 which ultimately are "used in
making military aircraft with a low radar signature, the so-called 'stealth'
aircraft."'66  The subcontractors manufactured the fibers in Japan. One
subcontractor processed the fibers into sheet products in Japan and then
imported them into the United States; whereas, the other subcontractor did
the processing in the United States.
67
a. Court of Federal Claims' Decisions
Zoltek brought suit against the Government claiming "that the process
used by or for" it in the manufacture of "silicon carbide fiber mats and
prepregs used in the F-22 fighter aircraft" infringed RE34,162 and sought
compensation under section 1498.68 The Government moved for partial
summary judgment claiming that Zoltek could not recover for infringement
of RE34,162 because section 1498 does not apply to "claim[s] arising in a
foreign country." 69 "This case present[ed] an unusually difficult question
of law and statutory interpretation. "70 The court contended that the
Government's motion depended on whether section 1498(c) "precludes
recovery from the [Government] for the use of a patented process without a
license where at least some elements of the process claim are practiced
outside of the United States by a government contractor."
71
First, the court determined that section 1498(c) "was intended as an
affirmative defense for the [G]overnment" and thus it has the burden of
proving that the claims arose in a foreign country. 72 Next, the court found
63 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 51 Fed. C1. 829, 830-831 (2002).
64 Zoltek Corp., 51 Fed. Cl. at 83 1.
65 Id. at 831.
66 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Plager, J.,
dissenting).
67 Id. at 1349 (majority opinion).
68 Zoltek Corp., 51 Fed. CI. at 831 (citations omitted).
69 Id. at 832.
70 Id. at 834.
71 Id. at 831-32.
72 Id. at 833.
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that "for infringement to occur in a foreign country, all elements or
processes that comprise infringement must take place in a foreign
country." 7 3 The court reasoned that according to the statute's context, the
word "claim" refers to an "infringement claim" - that is, the "entire legal
claim against the [Government]" - not a claim in a patent. 74 Otherwise, the
word "claim" would have no meaning in section 1498(b), which refers to
copyright "claim[s]." 7 5 Moreover, "at the time that section 1498(c) was
enacted, because a private citizen could avoid infringing a patent by
practicing one limitation in a foreign country, section 1498(c) was also
intended to exempt the ... Government from liability where any part of the
invention was practiced outside the United States." 76 Although a 1988
amendment to the Patent Act increased the scope of infringement between
private parties to include "those who import patented products, or products
made by a patented process," the court refused to read section 1498 to
encompass a cause of action for similar acts.
7 7
Next, the court proposed that "interpreting section 1498(c) to bar"
infringement claims where the Government or its subcontractors practices
some steps of a patented process outside the United States and imports
products made from said process "might violate the Fifth Amendment" or
may be in itself a Fifth Amendment taking.78 Accordingly, the court
ordered both parties to brief those issues. 79  In addition, after the
aforementioned order, the court allowed the parties to brief section 1337 of
Title 19 and the "headquarters claim doctrine."
' 80
In the court's opinion in which it addressed the parties' additional
briefings, it first held that section 1337 does not affect Zoltek's case
because the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the issue. 8 1 That is, the
International Trade Commission (ITC) has exclusive jurisdiction to hear
section 1337 cases, Zoltek did not present this issue to the ITC, and,
therefore, "there [was] no justiciable case or controversy" regarding a
possible section 1337 claim.82 The court acknowledged that section 1337
references "the procedures of section 1498," but did address "the
relationship between [sections] 1498[] and 1337.,83
73 Id. at 834 (emphasis added).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 836.
77 Id. at 836-37 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), (g)).
78 id. at 839.
79 Id.
80 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. C1. 688, 691 (2003).
81 See id. at 694-95.
82 -See id.
83 Id. at 695.
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Next, the court explained that the Government would win on the
merits unless Zoltek was entitled to recovery under the Tucker Act for the
Government taking its private property "for public use, without just
compensation." 84 The court noted that "patent rights" have consistently
been regarded as "property rights" and that when the Government infringes
one's patent then the Government has "'taken' the patent license under an
eminent domain theory, and compensation is the just compensation required
by the [F]ifth [A]mendment." 85  That is, section "1498's basis" is in
"eminent domain" and the Supreme Court interpreted section 1498's early
twentieth century predecessor as "converting. . . patent infringement" by
the Government "into a rightful appropriation by the [G]overnment
pursuant to the power of eminent domain."
86
In addition, the court held that, notwithstanding section 1498, Zoltek
has a cause of action against the Government for taking its patent rights and
the "Tucker Act provides the U.S. Court of Federal Claims with jurisdiction
to hear [such] takings claims." 87 The court reasoned that, before 1910, such
jurisdiction was unavailable to patentees because of the holding in
Schillinger; however, "Crozier effectively overruled Schillinger sub silentio
and reinstated the theory" 88 that the Government may not appropriate a
patentee's property rights - that is, the exclusive patent rights - without
paying the patentee "just compensation." 89  The court contended that
section 1498 and the Tucker Act dovetail each other because "[w]hen read
together they both confer jurisdiction on th[e] court to hear Zoltek's claim,
albeit for different rights." 90  Furthermore, the court refused to alter its
interpretation of section 1498 in light of the headquarters doctrine.
9 1
Accordingly, the court denied the Government's motion for partial
summary judgment, as the court found that section 1498 did not limit the
cause of action available to Zoltek under the Tucker Act.92 Because Zoltek
did not "allege[] in its complaint (original or amended) that a taking has
occurred outside of [section] 1498" and, moreover, "what type of taking it
[was]", the court gave Zoltek the opportunity to amend its complaint within
14 days of the order.
93
84 Id. at 695-96 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V; 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000)).
85 Id. at 696 (quoting Leesona Corp. v. United States, 220 Ct. Cl. 234 (1979) (emphasis
omitted); citing Decca Ltd. v. United States, 225 Ct. Cl. 326 (1980)).
86 Id. at 697, 699 (citing Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesell-schaft, 224 U.S. 290, 305
(1912)).
87 Id. at 700.
88 Id. at 702.
89 Id. (quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1881)).
90 Id. at 704.
91 See id. at 706-07.
92 Id. at 707; see id. at 704.
93 Id. at 706-07 (emphasis omitted).
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b. Federal Circuit's Decisions
On interlocutory appeal were two issues: first, whether the trial court
correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under section 1498 to hear
Zoltek's patent infringement claim against the Government because not all
steps of the infringed process occurred within the United States; and
second, whether the trial court correctly determined that it had jurisdiction
to hear Zoltek's patent infringement claim against the Government as a
Fifth Amendment taking under the Tucker Act.9 4 The Federal Circuit
affirmed the trial court on the former issue, that is, that Zoltek could not
assert its claims under section 1498. 95 Specifically, because the Federal
Circuit in NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd. stated that "direct
infringement under section 271(a) [of Title 35] is a necessary predicate for
government liability under section 1498" and a process cannot be used
"within" the United States as required by section 271 (a) unless each of the
steps is performed "within" the United States, the court found that
"where... not all steps of a patented process have been performed in the
United States, government liability does not exist" under section 1498.96
In contrast, the Federal Circuit's view of Zoltek's ability to receive
recovery under the Tucker Act deviated from the trial court's holding.9 7 In
particular, the Federal Circuit held that Schillinger was still good law and,
accordingly, Crozier did not overrule Schillinger because Crozier "was not
filed in the Court of Claims, had nothing to do with the Tucker Act, did not
allege a taking, and was solely in equity."9 8 Moreover, the Federal Circuit
contended that "by enacting the 1910 Act, Congress 'added the right to sue
the United States in the court of claims' for patent infringement."
9 9
The Federal Circuit dismissed relying upon the language of the 1910
Act or the Supreme Court's "discussion of [the 1910 Act] in Crozier" as
"affect[ed by] the rule in Schillinger" because Congress' "adopt[ion of] a
limited waiver of soverign immunity and confer[ence of] rights on
patentees for money damages against the [G]overnment ... cannot disturb
the Supreme Court's analysis of the Fifth Amendment in Schillinger."'
10 0
Furthermore, the majority felt that the "'property interests.., are not
created by the Constitution"' but "'are defined by existing rules . . . that
stem from an independent source such as state law"' - not like "patent
94 See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
95 See id.
96 Id. at 1350 (citing NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1316, 1318
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
97 See id.
98 Id. at 1351.
99 Id. (quoting Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesell-schaft, 224 U.S. 290, 304 (1912)).
100 Id. at 1352 (emphasis omitted).
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rights [which] are a creature of federal law."101 Likewise, the majority
stated that an interpretation of the Tucker Act to give Zoltek a cause of
action would "render superfluous [section] 1498-the remedy that
Congress fashioned specifically to compensate patentees for the use of their
patents by the... [G]overnment."' 10 2 Accordingly, the majority reversed
the trial court's finding "that Zoltek could allege patent infringement as a
Fifth Amendment taking under the Tucker Act."
' 10 3
i. Judge Gajarsa's Concurring Opinion
Judge Gajarsa added that the majority's opinion "does not depend for
its validity on NTP, as it is also supported by an independent line of
reasoning."' 1 4 Although he agreed that the court was "bound" by the NTP
rule - that is, "that 'direct infringement under section 271(a) is a necessary
predicate for government liability under section 1498"' - he felt that the
rule was "an unchecked propagation of error in [Federal Circuit] case law,
and its viability may eventually be challenged."' 1 5  Judge Garjarsa
identified four types of situations which may test section 1498: first, where
the Government or its subcontractors practice all the steps of a patented
process within the United States; second, where the Government or its
subcontractors practice all of the steps of a patented process on foreign soil;
third, where the Government or its subcontractors practice only the last step
on foreign soil; and fourth, where the Government or its subcontractors
practice the last step in the United States. 10 6 Judge Garjarsa contended that
only in the first scenario would a patentee have an action against the
Government under section 1498.107
ii. Judge Dyk's Concurring Opinion
Judge Dyk concurred with the majority's ruling; however, in contrast
to Judge Garjarsa, Judge Dyk contended "that the government can only be
liable for infringement under section 1498(a) if the same conduct would
render a private party liable for infringement under section 271(a)."'
' 0 8
Judge Dyk agreed with the Supreme Court in Richmond Screw Anchor Co.
v. United States, that the courts "must presume that Congress in the passage
101 Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984)).
102 Id. at 1353.
103 Id. (emphasis omitted).
104 Id. (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
105 Id. (quoting NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
106 See id. at 1360.
107 See id. at 1362-66.
108 Id. at 1368 (Dyk, J., concurring).
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of the act of 1918 intended to secure to the owner of the patent the exact
equivalent of what it was taking away from him." 109 Moreover, Judge Dyk
felt the 1942 amendment solidified his belief that Research in Motion
"correctly held" that "whether the [Government] had a lawful right to use
the invention turned on whether a private party would have had such a
right."110 Judge Dyk concluded by agreeing with the majority that Zoltek
lacked any action under the Tucker Act to assert a Fifth Amendment taking
against the Government and acknowledged that "[t]here [was] no occasion"
in Zoltek Corp. v. United States "to determine whether claims for
infringement liability under [sections] 27 1(f) and 271(g) may be brought in
suits against the government." I1'
iii. Judge Plager's Dissenting Opinion
In addressing the takings issue, Judge Plager articulated the policy
goal behind "just compensation" of "mak[ing] the property owner
whole." 112 Judge Plager argued "that the rights in an issued patent are
property" and, accordingly, the holder of a patent to which the Government
infringed should be made whole. '
13
The dissenting judge contended that "there is a way, unrelated to
infringement law and unique to the Government, through which a
patentee's right to exclude others may be obtained," that is, an action
against the Government pursuant to the Tucker Act. 114 Plager recognized
the majority's stapce against individuals bringing such an action and he
slammed the majority's acceptance and interpretation of Schillinger - the
case on which the majority based its rationale. 115 Specifically, that the
majority "equate[d] the taking claim with an infringement action" when
"[t]he tort of patent infringement is statutorily based and defined, and exists
at the discretion of Congress;" whereas, "the right to just compensation for
a taking is constitutional, it is not a tort, and it requires no legislative
blessing."' 1 16 Plager embraced Justice Harlan's dissent in Schillinger
where, approximately 132 years earlier, Justice Harlan stated that "[i]f the
claim here made to be compensated for the use of a patented invention is
not founded upon the constitution of the United States, it would be difficult
109 Id. at 1369-70 (quoting Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331,
345 (1928)) (emphasis added); see also supra Part.U.B.
110 Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d at 1368 (Dyk. J., concurring); see also supra Part.ll.B.
IIl Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d at 1370 n.4 (Dyk. J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
112 Id. at 1373 (Plager, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 1374 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982) ("[P]atents shall have that the attributes of
personal property.")).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1373.
116 Id. at 1375.
BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL
to imagine one that would be of the character."' 117
Dismissing the Supreme Court's reasoning in Schillinger as being part
of the early growing pains of the "then-new Tucker Act provision," Judge
Plager instead accepted the Supreme Court's decision in Jacobs, in which
"the identity of a separate, non-statutory, constitutional basis for takings
remedies under the Fifth Amendment emerged." 118 That is, "a cause of
action under the Fifth Amendment's taking clause is understood to be
neither a tort claim nor a contract claim, but a separate cause arising out of
the self-executing language of the Fifth Amendment." '1 19 Moreover, Judge
Plager emphasized that the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over
such actions vis-A-vis the first clause of the amended Tucker Act.
120
With respect to the section 1498 issue, Judge Plager found, inter alia,
that there is no linkage between section 271(a) and section 1498 and,
furthermore, "[a] cause of action does not 'arise' in a place just because any
one step of a multi-step process patent occurs there." 121  Next, the
dissenting judge explained that:
[T]he basic policy underlying [section] 1498 is that when the
Government has allegedly benefited from infringing conduct by its
contractors or subcontractors, and when fairness decrees that the
Government be held responsible for its wrongs-the fundamental
principle underlying section 1498(a)-then the fact that one or another
step of a process occurred outside the United States should not alone
immunize the Government from liability. 
12 2
Likewise, no foundation in policy or law exists which would
immunize the Government "from liability.., for the wrongful conduct of
its agents just because any one step of a multi-step patented method can be
found to have occurred outside the United States." 123 Relying on Crozier,
Judge Plager concluded that "[t]o the extent [section] 1498 is understood to
incorporate into its provisions the entitlements provided by the Fifth
Amendment's 'taking' clause, any statutory limitation providing less than
just compensation would be unconstitutional." 124  That is, even if a
patentee's remedy is constrained to a statute - section 1498 - then the
provisions must still satisfy the constitutional requirements - the Fifth
117 Id. at 1375-76 (quoting Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 179 (1894)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
118 Id. at 1376 (citing Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933)) (emphasis added).
119 Id.
120 See id. at 1377 (Plager, J., dissenting) (citing Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
121 Id. at 1382.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1384.
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Amendment. 125 Accordingly, Judge Plager held that that Zoltek established
"a cause of action under [section] 1498 for which relief co ild be granted"
with respect to only the processing done in both the United States and in
Japan. 1
26
iv. Petition for Rehearing En Banc
Zoltek filed a petition for rehearing en banc and after the authorized
circuit judges polled their colleagues as to whether to grant a rehearing of
Zoltek's appeal en banc, the Federal Circuit denied Zoltek's request.127 In
addition to denying the rehearing en banc, the court denied a petition for
rehearing. 1
28
Judge Newman dissented from denying Zoltek's petition for rehearing
en banc claiming that the majority's holding was "contrary to decision,
statute, policy, and constitutional right."' 129 The dissenting judge found it
atrocious that the majority rested their reasoning on Schillinger, a case
which Crozier "laid ... to rest" and "is almost a century out of date."
130
Judge Newman explained that Crozier "establish[ed] that the government's
right to use patent property was based on eminent domain and subject to the
Fifth Amendment" and found it "curious indeed for this court, a century
later, to resurrect Schillinger's long-rejected and long-overruled
decision." 131 Judge Newman listed four cases of primary authority which
stated "the premise that patents are property and subject to the Fifth
Amendment."'1 32 Furthermore, "Schillinger did not change the property
status of patents and did not discuss constitutional principles; the only issue
was whether the Court of Claims had jurisdiction under the Tucker Act." 
133
Judge Newman concluded by bringing the court's attention to the
Congressional Record during the time when the 1910 Act became law:
[E]very time that the United States Government assumes to take
forcibly, without the consent of the owner, a patented process, it
violates the constitutional provision which says no man's property shall
be taken without compensation and without due process of law. 1
34
125 Id. at 1385.
126 Id.
127 See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 464 F.3d 1335, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 1336 (Newman, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 1337, 1338.
131 Id. at 1336 (citing Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesell-schaft, 224 U.S. 290, 307
(1912)).
132 Id. (citing Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 642 (1999) ("Patents, however, have long been considered a species of property.")).
133 Id. at 1337.
134 Id. at 1338 (citing 45 CONG. REc. 8755, 8780 (1910) (quoting Frank Dunklee Currier,
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Judge Dyk, joined by Judge Gajarsa, wrote a concurring opinion in
which he underscored that the only remedy for private parties against the
Government "for patent misuse" is the "right of action against the




The relevant TRIPS agreement provisions are as follows:
Article 28
Rights Conferred
1. A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights:
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third
parties not having the owner's consent from the acts of: making, using,
offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product;
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third
parties not having the owner's consent from the act of using the
process, and from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or
importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by
that process.
2. Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by
succession, the patent and to conclude licensing contracts.
Article 30
Exceptions to Rights Conferred
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner,
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.
Article 31
Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder
Where the law of a Member allows for other use1 36 of the subject
matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder,
Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Patents).
135 Id. at 1339 (Dyk., J., concurring) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000)).
136 See TRIPS, supra note 10, art. 31, n.7 ("'Other use' refers to use other than that
allowed under Article 30.").
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including use by the government or third parties authorized by the
government, the following provisions shall be respected:
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed
user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on
reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have
not been successful within a reasonable period of time. This
requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of
public noncommercial use. In situations of national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless,
be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. In the case of public
non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, without
making a patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know
that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, the right
holder shall be informed promptly;
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the




2. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Part and provided that
the provisions of Part II specifically addressing use by governments, or
by third parties authorized by a government, without the authorization
of the right holder are complied with, Members may limit the remedies
available against such use to payment of remuneration in accordance
with subparagraph (h) of Article 31. In other cases, the remedies under
this Part shall apply or, where these remedies are inconsistent with a
Member's law, declaratory judgments and adequate compensation shall
be available.
1 3 7
B. American Law may not be in Compliance with TRIPS
After the Federal Circuit's holding in Zoltek, it is clear that patentees
lack a cause of action against the Government if the Government or its
subcontractors imports products created from a patented process which the
Government or its subcontractors did not practice all the steps within the
137 TRIPS, supra note 10, arts. 28, 30-31,44 (emphasis added).
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United States. 138  This Author contends that such an interpretation of
American law may be in violation of Articles 28, 30, 31, and 44 of the
TRIPS agreement. 139  In summary, Article 28 establishes that process
patents must afford its holders the "exclusive right," inter alia, "to prevent
third parties" from "importing... the product obtained directly that
process"; Article 30 allows for signatories to provide "limited exceptions"
to Article 28 as long as those "exceptions do not unreasonable conflict with
a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking into account the legitimate
interests of third parties"; Article 31 "allows" for government use of patents
- or the use by third parties which are authorized by its respective
government - as long as the patentee is notified of the government use
within a reasonable amount of time and the patentee is "paid adequate
remuneration" for the government use; and Article 44 allows signatories to
"limit the remedies available against" unauthorized government use to
"payment of remuneration" as detailed in Article 31.140
Taking Article 30 out of the equation, American law is clearly in
violation of TRIPS, as Zoltek was denied payment of any form of
compensation - and may not have been notified of such use - after a
government contractor imported a product made directly from Zoltek's
patented process for the Government's use. 141 However, Article 30 makes
the existence of a violation less clear. That is, under Article 30 the United
States may create "limited exceptions" to the "exclusive rights" of Article
28, which includes the exclusive right to "prevent" - for example -
government contractors from importing products manufactured from
patented processes. Whether such exceptions are in conformance with
TRIPS depends on determining whether the exceptions (1) are "limited";
(2) "do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent";
and (3) "do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner, taking into account the legitimate interests of third parties."
Legal commentators have noted that "a WTO dispute panel has
already narrowed the interpretation of 'limited' use to mean a 'small
diminution' of the general rights of a patentee" and that "[t]he complete
lack of any restrictions on or requirements for the [G]overnment's use of
private patents under [section] 1498(a) is unlikely to pass muster" as the
138 See Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d 1345; supra Part H.C.I .b.
139 See TRIPS, supra note 10, arts. 28, 30-31, 44; see also LiLan Ren, A Comparison of
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) and Foreign Statutes and an Analysis of § 1498(a)'s Compliance with
TRIPS, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1659, 1677-79 (2005) (discussing possibility of section 1498
conflicting with Articles 28 and 30).
140 See TRIPS, supra note 10, arts. 28, 30-31, 44.
141 See Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d 1345; TRIPS, supra note 10, arts. 28, 30-31, 44; see also
supra Part B.C. 1.b.
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"WTO reject[ed] Canada's argument that... 'limited' ... should be
[broadly] interpreted according to its ordinary meaning." 142 By
interpreting Article 30 too broadly, a WTO panel would render Article 31
meaningless, as the right of a patentee to receive compensation for
government use is a provision that "shall be respected."' 143  It seems
unlikely that a WTO panel would allow a signatory to create exceptions to
exclusive rights which, in practice, would remove entire Articles. 
144
Furthermore, allowing such a limitation would "unreasonably conflict
with a normal exploitation of the patent"'145 because, in a situation like
Zoltek where defense contracting is exclusively done vis-A-vis the
Government, it could cost the patentee its entire market share for its
patented invention. 146  For those same reasons, this would also cause
"unreasonabl[e] prejudice" to the patentee's "legitimate interests" and, in
short, no third party interests could likely outweigh the patent holder's loss
because the only third parties benefiting are the alleged unauthorized users
of the patent - that is, the Government and its subcontractor Lockheed
Martin. 147 In fact even where there are significant third party interests, a
WTO panel has held against the unauthorized government user.148
Accordingly, this Author finds that Article 28 creates an exclusive
right for patentees to prevent imports of products made from their patented
processes which Article 30 probably cannot exempt for government use.
14 9
Consequently, under Article 31 the Government may violate this exclusive
right and authorize others to violate said right, but the Government must, in
exchange, give notice 150 and pay compensation to the patentee; otherwise,
the Government is not in compliance with the TRIPS agreement. 151 For
those reasons, the Federal Circuit's interpretation of section 1498 and the
Fifth Amendment in Zoltek may be in violation of the TRIPS agreement
and should be overruled by Congress amending section 1498.152
142 Ren, supra note 140, at 1678-78, n.136 (internal citations omitted).
143 See TRIPS, supra note 10, arts. 30-3 1.
144 Id.
145 TRIPS, supra note 10, art. 30
146 See Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d 1345; see also supra Part Ll.C. 1.b.
147 See Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d 1345; see also supra Part I.C. 1 .b.
148 See, e.g., Ren, supra note 140, at 1679 (discussing WTO panel holding against
Canada that "providing... low cost medication to be in violation of TRIPS").
149 See generally TRIPS, supra note 10, arts. 28-30.
150 This Author lacks any evidence as to whether the Government gave Zoltek notice and
this issue should be further explored as it may comprise a separate violation of the TRIPS
agreement. See TRIPS, supra note 10, art. 31.
151 See TRIPS, supra note 10, arts. 28, 30-31, 44.
152 See TRIPS, supra note 10, arts. 28, 30-31, 44; see Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d 1345; see
also supra Part II.C. I .b.





The modern embodiment of Australia's Patents Act 153 states:
Schedule 1-Dictionary
Section 3
In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:
exploit, in relation to an invention, includes:
(a) where the invention is a product-make, hire, sell or otherwise
dispose of the product, offer to make, sell, hire or otherwise dispose of
it, use or import it, or keep it for the purpose of doing any of those
things; or
(b) where the invention is a method or process-use the method or
process or do any act mentioned in paragraph (a) in respect of a
product resulting from such use.
163 Exploitation of inventions by Crown
(1)Where, at any time after a patent application has been made, the
invention concerned is exploited by the Commonwealth or a State (or
by a person authorised in writing by the Commonwealth or a State) for
the services of the Commonwealth or the State, the exploitation is not
an infringement:
(a)if the application is pending-of the nominated person's rights in
the invention; or
(b) if a patent has been granted for the invention--of the patent.
(2) A person may be authorised for the purposes of subsection (1):
(a) before or after any act for which the authorisation is given has
been done; and
(b) before or after a patent has been granted for the invention; and
(c) even if the person is directly or indirectly authorised by the
nominated person or patentee to exploit the invention.
(3) Subject to section 168, an invention is taken for the purposes of
153 The legislature's amendments passed in 2000 did not affect the provisions listed in
this paper; see Patents Amendment (INNOVATION PATENTS) Act, 2000, c. 17 (Austl.).
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this Part to be exploited for services of the Commonwealth or of a State
if the exploitation of the invention is necessary for the proper provision
of those services within Australia.
164 Nominated person or patentee to be informed of exploitation
As soon as practicable after an invention has been exploited under
subsection 163(1), the relevant authority must inform the applicant and
the nominated person, or the patentee, of the exploitation and give him
or her any information about the exploitation that he or she from time
to time reasonably requires, unless it appears to the relevant authority
that it would be contrary to the public interest to do so.
165 Remuneration and terms for exploitation
(2) The terms for the exploitation of the invention (including terms
concerning the remuneration payable to the nominated person or the
patentee) are such terms as are agreed, or determined by a method
agreed, between the relevant authority and the nominated person or the
patentee or, in the absence of agreement, as are determined by a
prescribed court on the application of either party.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), the terms, or the method, may
be agreed before, during or after the exploitation.
(4) When fixing the terms, the court may take into account any
compensation that a person interested in the invention or the patent has
received, directly or indirectly, for the invention from the relevant
authority.
165A Exploitation of invention to cease under court order
(1) A prescribed court may, on the application of the nominated
person or the patentee, declare that the exploitation of the invention by
the Commonwealth or the State is not, or is no longer, necessary for
the proper provision of services of the Commonwealth or of the State if
the court is satisfied that, in all the circumstances of the case, it is fair
and reasonable to make the declaration.
(2) The court may further order that the Commonwealth or the State
is to cease to exploit the invention:
(a) on and from the day specified in the order; and
(b) subject to any conditions specified in the order.
In making the order, the court is to ensure that the legitimate interests
of the Commonwealth or of the State are not adversely affected by the
order.
167 Sale of products
(1) The right to exploit an invention under subsection 163(1) includes
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the right to sell products made in exercise of that right.
(2) Where under subsection 163(1) the sale of products is not an
infringement of:
(a) a patent; or
(b) a nominated person's rights in the products;
the buyer, and any person claiming through the buyer, is entitled to deal
with the products as if the relevant authority were the patentee or the
nominated person.
168 Supply of products by Commonwealth to foreign countries
Where the Commonwealth has made an agreement with a foreign
country to supply to that country products required for the defence of
the country:
(a) the use of a product or process by the Commonwealth, or by a
person authorised in writing by the Commonwealth, for the supply of
that product is to be taken, for the purposes of this Chapter, to be use of
the product or process by the Commonwealth for the services of the
Commonwealth; and
(b) the Commonwealth or the authorised person may sell those
products to the country under the agreement; and
(c) the Commonwealth or the authorised person may sell to any
person any of the products that are not required for the purpose for
which they were made.
169 Declarations that inventions have been exploited
(1) Subject to subsection (4), a patentee who considers that the
patented invention has been exploited under subsection 163(1) may
apply to a prescribed court for a declaration to that effect.
(2) In proceedings under subsection (1):
(a) the alleged relevant authority is the defendant; and
(b) the alleged relevant authority may apply by way of counter-claim
in the proceedings, for the revocation of the patent.
(3) The provisions of this Act relating to the revocation of patents
apply, with the necessary changes, to a counter-claim.
(4) An application under subsection (1) in respect of an innovation
patent cannot be made unless the patent has been certified.
Part 3-Acquisitions by and assignments to the Crown
171 Acquisition of inventions or patents by Commonwealth
(1) The Governor-General may direct that a patent, or an invention
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that is the subject of a patent application, be acquired by the
Commonwealth.
(2) When a direction is given, all rights in respect of the patent or the
invention are, by force of this subsection, transferred to and vested in
the Commonwealth.
(3) Notice of the acquisition must be:
(a) given to the applicant and the nominated person, or the patentee;
and
(b) published in the Official Journal and the Gazette unless, in the
case of the acquisition of an invention that is the subject of an
application for a patent, a prohibition order, or an order under
section 152, is in force in respect of the application.
(4) The Commonwealth must pay a compensable person such
compensation as is agreed between the Commonwealth and the person
or, in the absence of agreement, as is determined by a prescribed court
on the application of either of them. 
154
2. Comparison to American Law
The text of Australia's Patents Acts contains all the protections that
section 1498 affords patentees; however, it goes further in defending the
patentee's rights. 155 First, in section 163, the Australian statute goes out of
its way to define government use or "exploitation" - or the use by others
whom are authorized by the government - "not [as] an infringement" but as
rights "taken." 156 Such a provision may have saved the American courts
from the Fifth Amendment interpretation difficulties it faced while
qualifying the exploitation of patents by the Government. 1
57
Second, under section 165A, the Australian statute gives the patentee
the ability to challenge its government's use by establishing, in court, that
such exploitation is "not, or is no lbnger necessary for the proper provision
of services of the" Australian government. 158 Under section 1498 and
Zoltek, the American patentee has no such right; whereas, the Australian
patentee has an opportunity to make a claim like an American non-patent
property owner has under the Fifth Amendment, that is, that the taking is
154 Patents Act, 1990, c. 17 (Austl.), available at
http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/I/545/rtf/Patents1990.rtf [hereinafter Australian
Act] (emphasis added).
155 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000), and Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d 1345 with Australian
Act, supra note 155.
156 Australian Act, supra note 155, § 163 (emphasis added).
157 See, e.g., Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d 1345; see also supra Part H.C. .b.
158 Australian Act, supra note 155, § 165A.
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not "for public use."' 15 9 Third, under section 164, the Australian statute
mandates that notice be given to the patentee when the Australian
government exploits the patentee's invention. 160 Finally, the Patents Act's
definition of "exploit" includes using the "process or do[ing] any act
mentioned in paragraph (a) in respect of a product resulting from such
use."' 16 1 The referenced paragraph (a) refers to "import[ing]" products.
16 2
Therefore, unlike in American law, Australian patentees are entitled to
compensation when their government - or persons authorized by the





The modern embodiment of the United Kingdom's Patents Act states:
Use of patented inventions for services of the Crown
55.-(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, any government
department and any person authorised in writing by a government
department may, for the services of the Crown and in accordance with
this section, do any of the following acts in the United Kingdom in
relation to a patented invention without the consent of the proprietor of
the patent, that is to say -
(a) where the invention is a product, may -
(i) make, use, import or keep the product, or sell or offer to sell it where
to do so would be incidental or ancillary to making, using, importing or
keeping it; or
(ii) in any event, sell or offer to sell it for foreign defence purposes or
for the production or supply of specified drugs and medicines, or
dispose or offer to dispose of it (otherwise than by selling it) for any
purpose whatever;
(b) where the invention is a process, may use it or do in relation to any
product obtained directly by means of the process anything mentioned
in paragraph (a) above;
(c) without prejudice to the foregoing, where the invention or any
product obtained directly by means of the invention is a spec;fied drug
159 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000), Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d 1345, and U.S. CONST.
amend. V with Australian Act, supra note 155.
160 Australian Act, supra note 144, § 164.
161 Australian Act, supra note 144, § 3(b).
162 Australian Act, supra note 144, § 3(a).
163 Compare Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d 1345 with Australian Act, supra note 155.
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or medicine, may sell or offer to sell the drug or medicine;
(d) may supply or offer to supply to any person any of the means,
relating to an essential element of the invention, for putting the
invention into effect;
(e) may dispose or offer to dispose of anything which was made, used,
imported or kept in the exercise of the powers conferred by this section
and which is no longer required for the purpose for which it was made,
used, imported or kept (as the case may be),
and anything done by virtue of this subsection shall not amount to an
infringement of the patent concerned.
(2) Any act done in relation to an invention by virtue of this section is
in the following provisions of this section referred to as use of the
invention; and "use", in relation to an invention, in sections 56 to 58
below shall be construed accordingly.
(4) So far as the invention has not been so recorded or tried, any use of
it made by virtue of this section at any time either -
(a) after the publication of the application for the patent for the
invention; or
(b) without prejudice to paragraph (a) above, in consequence of a
relevant communication made after the priority date of the invention
otherwise than in confidence;
shall be made on such terms as may be agreed either before or after the
use by the government department and the proprietor of the patent with
the approval of the Treasury or as may in default of agreement be
determined by the court on a reference under section 58 below.
(5) Where an invention is used by virtue of this section at any time after
publication of an application for a patent for the invention but before
such a patent is granted, and the terms for its use agreed or determined
as mentioned in subsection (4) above include terms as to payment for
the use, then (notwithstanding anything in those terms) any such
payment shall be recoverable only -
(a) after such a patent is granted; and
(b) if (apart from this section) the use would, if the patent had been
granted on the date of the publication of the application, have infringed
not only the patent but also the claims (as interpreted by the description
and any drawings referred to in the description or claims) in the form in
which they were contained in the application immediately before the
preparations for its publication were completed by the Patent Office.
(6) The authority of a government department in respect of an invention
may be given under this section either before or after the patent is
BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LA W JOURNAL
granted and either before or after the use in respect of which the
authority is given is made, and may be given to any person whether or
not he is authorised directly or indirectly by the proprietor of the patent
to do anything in relation to the invention.
(7) Where any use of an invention is made by or with the authority of a
government department under this section, then, unless it appears to
the department that it would be contrary to the public interest to do so,
the department shall notify the proprietor of the patent as soon as
practicable after the second of the following events, that is to say, the
use is begun and the patent is granted, and furnish him with such
information as to the extent of the use as he may from time to time
require.
Compensation for loss of profit
57A.-(1) Where use is made of an invention for the services of the
Crown, the government department concerned shall pay -
(a) to the proprietor of the patent, or
(b) if there is an exclusive licence in force in respect of the patent, to
the exclusive licensee,
compensation for any loss resulting from his not being awarded a
contract to supply the patented product or, as the case may be, to
perform the patented process or supply a thing made by means of the
patented process.
(5) The amount payable shall, if not agreed between the proprietor or
licensee and the government department concerned with the approval
of the Treasury, be determined by the court on a reference under
section 58, and is in addition to any amount payable under section 55 or
57.
References of disputes as to Crown use
58.-(1) Any dispute as to -
(a) the exercise by a government department, or a person authorised by
a government department, of the powers conferred by section 55 above,
(b) terms for the use of an invention for the services of the Crown
under that section,
(c) the right of any person to receive any part of a payment made in
pursuance of subsection (4) of that section, or
(d) the right of any person to receive a payment under section 57A,
may be referred to the court by either party to the dispute after a patent
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has been granted for the invention. 164
2. Comparison To American Law
The text of the United Kingdom's Patents Acts embodies all the rights
that section 1498 affords patentees; however, the British protect patentees
beyond that in which America does. 165 First, in section 55, the British
statute states that the government use under the Patents Act "shall not
amount to an infringement of the patent concerned" but rather as "use of the
inventionFalse" 166 Second, under sections 55 and 58, the British statute
allows the patentee to challenge the British government's use by an in court
showing that such use is not "for the services of the Crown" and thus
"dispute... [the] terms for the use." 167 As aforementioned, under section
1498 and Zoltek, the American patentee has no such right; whereas, the
British patentee has an opportunity to make a claim like an American non-
patent property owner has under the Fifth Amendment, that is, that the
taking is not "for public use." 168 Third, under section 55, the British statute
mandates that notice be given to the patentee when the British government
uses the patentee's invention "unless it would be contrary to the public
interest to do so. ' ' 169 Finally, section 55 defines government use of a
process patent to include "do[ing] in relation to any product obtained
directly by means of the process anything mentioned in paragraph (a)
above." 170  Paragraph (a) includes "import[ing]... the product."'
17 1
Therefore, in contrast to American law, British patentees are entitled to
compensation when their government - or persons authorized by the
government - import products made from the British patentees' patented
processes. 172
164 Patents Act, 1977, ch. 37, §§ 55, 57A-58, 60 (Eng.), available at
http://www.patent.gov.uk/patentsact1977.pdf [hereinafter British Act] (as amended up to and
including Oct. 1, 2006).
165 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000), and Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d 1345 with British Act,
supra note 165, § 55.
166 British Act, supra note 165, §§ 55, 58 (emphasis added).
167 British Act, supra note 165, § 58(1).
168 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000), and Zoltek Corp., 442
F.3d 1345 with British Act, supra note 154.
169 See British Act, supra note 154, § 55.
170 See British Act, supra note 154, § 55.
171 See British Act, supra note 154, § 55.
172 Compare Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d 1345 with British Act, supra note 154, § 55; see also
supra Part II.C. L.b.
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C. Israeli Law
1. Statutory Text
The modern embodiment of Israel's Patents Law states:
[Definitions]
1. In this Law-
"exploitation of an invention"-
(1) in respect of an invention that is a product-any act that is one of the
following: production, use, offer for sale, sale, or import for purposes
of one of the said acts;
(2) in respect of an invention that is a process-use of the process, and
in respect of a product directly derived from the process-any act that is
one of the following: production, use, offer for sale, sale, or import for
purposes of one of the said acts;
Article Three
Use of Inventions in the Interest of the State
[Right of State to exploit invention]
104. The Minister may permit the exploitation of an invention by
Government departments or by an enterprise or agency of the State,
whether a patent for it has or has not already been granted or has or has
not already been applied for, if he finds that that is necessary in the
interests of the National security or of the maintenance of essential
supplies and services.
[Right of State to permit exploitation of invention]
105. The Minister may, if he finds that that is necessary for the
purposes enumerated in section 104, grant a permit under that section
to a person who operates under contract with the State, in order to
ensure or facilitate the implementation of that contract and for the
requirements of the State only.
[Notice of Grant of exploitation permit]
106. When a permit has been granted under this Article, the Minister
shall notify the owner of the invention or the patent holder and the
holder of the exclusive license that the permit was granted and the
scope of the permitted use, unless National security requires otherwise.
Article Four
Obligation of State to Pay Compensation and Royalties
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[Royalties for use of patents by the State]
108. If a permit was granted under sections 104 or 105, then the State
Treasury shall pay to the owner of the invention, to the patent holder or
to the holder of an exclusive license, as the case may be, royalties set
by agreement between the parties or-in the absence of agreement-set by
the compensation and royalties committee. 1
73
2. Comparison To American Law
The text of Israel's Patents Law consists of all the protection that
section 1498 affords American patentees; however, the Israelis extend
rights to patentees in excess to that in which America does. 17 4 First, it is
arguable that because under section 104 the Israeli Minister's discretion "to
permit the exploitation of an invention by" the Israeli government is limited
to circumstances in which the Minister determines that it "in the interests of
[Israel's n]ational security or of the maintenance of essential supplies and
services," that an Israeli patentee could possibly dispute that the Minister
acted within her discretion. 175 As mentioned above, under section 1498
and Zoltek, the American patentee has no such right; whereas, the Israeli
patentee has an opportunity to make a claim like an American non-patent
property owner has under the Fifth Amendment, that is, that the taking is
not "for public use." 176  Second, under section 106, the Israeli statute
requires that the Minister notify the patentee when the Israeli government
exploits the patentee's invention "unless National security requires
otherwise." 177  Finally, section 1 defines government exploitation of a
process patent to include "in respect of a product directly derived from the
process-any act that is ... import[ing]. ' ' 17 8 Accordingly, contrary to
American law, Israeli patentees are entitled to compensation when their
government - or persons authorized by the government's minister - import
products made from the Israeli patentees' patented processes. 1
79
173 Patents Law, 5727-1967, 510 LSI 148 (1967-68) (Isr.) [hereinafter Israeli Law],
(emphasis added), available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docsnew/en/il/ilOOen.html.
174 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000), and Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d 1345 with Israeli Law,
supra note 174.
175 Israeli Law, supra note 174, art. 104.
176 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000), U.S. CONST. amend. V, and Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d
1345 with Israeli Law, supra note 174, art. 104.
177 See Israeli Law, supra note 174, art. 106.
178 See Israeli Law, supra note 174, arts. 1, 104.
179 Compare Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d 1345 with Israeli Law, supra note 174.
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V.
THE AUTHOR'S LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
A. Statutory Text
A BILL
To amend chapter 14 of title 28, United States Code, relating to the
infringement of an individual's patent rights by the Government or its
subcontractors, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
This Act may be cited as the "Fairness in Government Patent
Infringement Act of 2007" (the "Legislation").
SEC. 2. GOVERNMENT USE OF PRIVATE PARTIES'
PATENTS
Section 1498 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at
the end of subsection (a) the following:
(1) Whenever the Government, a contractor, a subcontractor, or any
person, firm, or corporation for the Government and with the authorization
or consent of the Government, without authority,
imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses
within the United States a product which is made by a
process patented in the United States shall be liable as an
infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the
product occurs during the term of such process patent. In an
action for infringement of a process patent, no remedy may be
granted for infringement on account of the noncommercial use
or retail sale of a product unless there is no adequate remedy
under this title for infringement on account of the importation
or other use, offer to sell, or sale of that product. A product
which is made by a patented process will, for purposes of this
title, not be considered to be so made after -
[(i)] it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or
[(ii)] it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another
product."
180
(2) When the Government, or persons or entities which it authorizes,
uses a patented invention within the scope of section 1498, the Government
shall notify the patent holder within a reasonable time of such use unless
notification would be contrary to the public interest. 181
180 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2003).
181 It should be appreciated that the citation in the text of the Author's quoting of statute




1. Takings and Patent Law Policies
The Fifth Amendment reads that "[n]o person shall be deprived
of... property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." 182 The language clearly
addresses the need of the Government, from time to time, to take private
property for the benefit of American society, that is, "for public use";
however, the founders "designed [the Fifth Amendment] to bar [the]
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole" and
thus the founders mandated the Government to provide "just compensation"
to the injured property owner. 
183
Judges and legal scholars have consistently recognized that "the only
dependable foundation of personal liberty is the personal economic security
of private property."' 184 The need for a constitutional amendment to give
private citizens such a "security" grew out of the founders' "sensible
mistrust of [G]overnment power"; specifically, "the historic reasoning holds
that government appetites are-by reason of human nature and [American]
political institutions-unlimited, and that the expectation of self-restraint by
government to curb effectively its own appetite is a fool's dream." 185 Such
skepticism grew out "of the American colonial experience" which "led
[American] society to place constitutional barriers to obstruct, or at least to
impede, all of [the] [G]overnment's shortcuts in satisfying its varied
desires." 186
Likewise, the policies behind patent law emanate from the
Constitution. 187 Tiat is, "Congress shall.., promote the Progress of...
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to... Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Discoveries. '"188 This language mandates
Congress to establish a patent system that gives inventors an incentive - a
monopoly vis-A-vis exclusive rights to exploit their inventions and thus
be omitted.
182 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
183 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
184 Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d at 1373 n.5 (Plager, J., dissenting) (citing WALTER LIPPMAN,
THE METHOD OF FREEDOM 101-02 (1934)).
185 Id.; Bruce Burton, Regulatory Takings, Private Property Protection Acts, and The
"Moragne Principle:" A Proposal For Judicial-Legislative Comity, 49 S.C. L. REV. 83, 88-
89 (1997) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1961).
186 Burton, supra note 186, at 89.
187 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
188 Id.
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exclude others from doing the same. 18 9 The Supreme Court has recently
recognized that "[t]he monopoly is a property right; and like any property
right, its boundaries should be clear. This clarity is essential to promote
progress, because it enables efficient investment in innovation. A patent
holder should know what he owns, and the public should know what he
does not." 190 Consequently, in exchange for this property right and
monopoly, the innovator discloses her entire invention to the public in the
form of a patent so the public may build off of the innovator's genius to
create its own innovations. 
19 1
This Author cannot come up with any legitimate policies the
Government may further by not compensating patentees for the
Government's subcontractors acts of importing products into the United
States which were made from the patentees' patented processes oversees,
but subjecting private parties to liability for the same conduct. 
19 2
First, the Zoltek holding will only cause more distrust of the
Government, as a recitation of the facts sounds as though the Government
allowed a taking of Zoltek's patent without compensation.193 Next, there is
no legitimate policy reason why Zoltek should be forced to individually
bear the costs associated with keeping Lockheed Martin's costs down, so in
turn the Government may pay less than the next highest bid. 194 If the
Government deems that allowing its subcontractors to use patented
processes oversees and import products made from those processes into the
United States because, for example, Zoltek was unwilling to grant a license
to Lockheed Martin for a technology which would benefit the
Government's defense capabilities, then society should share the costs
associated with justly compensating Zoltek - as Lockheed Martin was
exploiting the invention "for public use."' 19 5 Not paying patentees for the
right to exploit their inventions is a questionable area for the Government to
begin cutting expenses.
Finally, the Government gives exclusive rights to patentees in
exchange for disclosure of their technologies. 19 6  It has been widely
189 See id.
190 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 730-31
(2002).
191 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
192 See 19 U.S.C. 1337 (2004); see also 35 U.S.C. 271(g) (2003); see also Zoltek v.
United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Plager, J., dissenting) (dissenting judge
also finding no policy reasons).
193 See Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d 1345; see also supra Part ll.C. 1 .b.
194 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Zoltek Corp., 442
F.3d 1345.
195 See Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49; U.S. CONST. amend V.




accepted that the Government may execute a de facto compulsory license
"for public use"; however, by not compensating patentees the Government
violates its end of the bargain. 197 Most importantly, in areas of defense
technology, by not providing compensation in circumstances like that in
Zoltek, start-up companies may think twice about filing for patents on their
innovations before having contracts with the Government-because of a
lack of incentive-and this may gradually retard innovation in that
sector. 
198
2. Problems With The Current State of American Law
The main problem with American law-that is, the American law
characterized in this paper-is that while process patentees can prevent
private parties from importing products manufactured from the patentees'
patented processes under section 271(g) and section 1337, those same
patentees currently have no remedy against the Government or its
subcontractors for partaking in the same behavior as said private parties. 199
This Author contends that Congress carelessly drafted section 1498;
however, like section 271(a) there should be no liability for one practicing a
process patent unless one practices all the steps "within the United
States"-such a premise was likely behind section 1498(c).2 °° To find
otherwise would be to extend American law too far; however, protecting
patentees from imports created from the unauthorized use of patented
processes seems like a logical medium in which United States patentees are
protected without overextending United States law.
This Author believes that Judge Plager was partially correct in that the
exclusive rights given to patent holders in exchange for disclosure of their
invention are property rights; private citizens and entities are liable to patent
holders under section 271(g) and section 1337 for importing products into
the United States made from patented processes even if the one practiced
the processes outside the United States; and, therefore, the Government or
its subcontractors partaking in that same conduct results in a taking of the
patentee's exclusive right which requires a payment of "just
compensation." 20 1 Unfortunately, the majority of Federal Circuit judges
feel differently about the takings issue and thus legislative change is the
197 U.S. CONST. amend V.
198 See Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 730-31; see also Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d 1345; see also
supra Part II.C. .b.
199 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2004); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2003); see also Zoltek
Corp., 442 F.3d 1345; see also supra Part II.C. 1 .b.
200 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003); see 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1998).
201 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2004); see also 28 U.S.C. §
1498 (1998); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2003); see also Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d at 1376
(Plager, J., dissenting).
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only practical way to fairly compensate patentees for the Government's
unauthorized use. 202
America's allies do it differently, that is, Australia, the United
Kingdom, and Israel all pay forms of compensation to patentees for such
government use and the TRIPS agreement arguably requires such.203
Because this Author believes that the tort of patent infringement is different
from the Government taking an exclusive patent right, it is necessary to
amend section 1498 to reflect the changes in section 271, that is, they do
not impliedly reference each other. 204  Subsection 1 of the Legislation
reflects these necessary changes by importing the language from section
271(g) regarding imported products made from patented processes in
section 1498.205 Such a change would require the Government to
reasonably compensate patentees for such unauthorized exploitation
oversees as soon as the fruits of that unauthorized exploitation reach
America's shores. Chiefly, this would have given Zoltek a remedy against
the Government for Lockheed Martin's behavior and provide some sort of
compensation for the research and development Zoltek put into their
innovation.
206
In addition, Australia, the United Kingdom, Israel, and TRIPS all
mandate notice to be given to patentees when the government uses or
exploits the patentees' inventions and that is why this Author added
subsection 2 to the Legislation.20 7 Although giving notice is the general
rule under the Legislation, the Author contends that circumstances will
likely arise where giving notice will be against America's national security
interest or some other important societal interest and thus the Author added
the exception to the Legislation to provide for such circumstances.
VI.
CONCLUSION
In addressing Congress, Abraham Lincoln spoke that "it is 'as much
the duty of government to render prompt justice against itself, in favor of
citizens, as it is to administer the same between private individuals.'
20 8
202 See Zoltek Corp., 464 F.3d 1335 (en banc).
203 See Australian Act, supra note 155; see also British Act, supra note 165; see also
Israeli Law, supra note 174; see also TRIPS, supra note 10, arts. 28, 30-31, 44.
204 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2003); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1998); see also Zoltek Corp.,
442 F.3d at 1376 (Plager, J., dissenting).
205 See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1998); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2003).
206 Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d 1345; see also supra Part Il.C.I .b.
207 Australian Act, supra note 155; British Act, supra note 165; Israeli Law, supra note
174; TRIPS, supra note 10, arts. 28, 30-31, 44.
208 United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 213 (1983) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong.,
2d Sess., app. 2 (1862)).
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Unless the Government and its subcontractors cease importing products into
the United States made from others' patented processes oversees then more
American businesses will suffer at the reigns of the Zoltek decision and
section 1498.209 Instead of waiting for similar cases to come before the
Federal Circuit and for the mere possibility that the Supreme Court will
grant writ and happen to reverse Zoltek, Congress should step in and ratify
legislation which embodies the amendment to section 1498 depicted in the
Legislation.
2 10
209 See Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d 1345; see also supra Part I.C. 1 .b.
210 See Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d 1345; see also supra Part II.C. I .b.

